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INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of District of Columbia v. Heller,' in which the Supreme Court struck down the District of Columbia's handgun ban and found an individual right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment, a prominent issue remains unresolved: whether or to what extent the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms outside of the home-often referred to as the right to "public carry." This Article explores this unresolved issue through a newly uncovered source, the congressional debates surrounding another D.C. firearm lawthe regulation of public carry-in the 1890s.
Since Heller, three public carry-related issues have arisen in Second Amendment litigation: (1) whether the Second Amendment protects a right to carry firearms in public at all; (2) whether the Second Amendment protects a right to a specific kind of carry-open (a firearm exposed to public view is applied: intermediate or strict, depending on how close the challenged law falls to the core of the right. ' Because of this methodology, the historical understanding of the right to keep and bear arms, as well as the historical scope of firearms regulation, has played a prominent role in Second Amendment litigation. Unfortunately, this history has often been mischaracterized by gun-lobby scholars in supporting constitutional challenges to contemporary public carry regulations. They argue that the only historical doctrinal debate surrounding the Second Amendment was whether it protected an individual right or pertained to a collectivist militia-based right-a legal debate which Heller ended."o They also claim that public carry was historically unregulated across the country and, therefore, the individual right recognized in Heller should apply broadly outside the home." Historians and legal scholars have recently disputed both arguments, finding instead that founding-era state laws consistently regulated carry, while Civil War-and post-Civil War-era state laws-and views on the scope of the Second Amendment right-varied dramatically by region.
These findings are most clearly articulated by Saul Cornell and Eric Ruben in an article published in the Yale Law Journal Forum, Firearm Regionalism and Public Carry: Placing Southern Antebellum Case Law in Context. 12 Cornell and Ruben argue that, during the founding era, most states adopted preexisting English law regulating the carrying of weapons, specifically the Statute of Northampton, a 1328 English law that prohibited carrying weapons in public. 1 3 Many states adopted the Statute of Northampton in their legal codes, and it was applicable through the common
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THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE ON PUBLIC CARRY law in other states. 14 While there is some debate as to the scope of the prohibition under the Statute of Northampton and its progeny, no credible scholar from either side of the debate disputes that the Northampton formulation governed public carry during the period."
By the 1830s, this national uniformity had broken down, and at least two regional traditions developed, according to Cornell and Ruben." The "Massachusetts model," common in the North and Midwest, prohibited carrying firearms in public generally, with an exception for those with a specific reason to fear for their safety." In the Deep South, an alternative tradition developed, which allowed open carry but prohibited concealed carry.1 8 After the Civil War, a third tradition developed in the Western states, which prohibited carry completely in populated cities and towns but allowed carry with no restrictions in the lawless rural frontier. 19 The Massachusetts model also moved into some Deep South and border states during this time period.
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The congressional debates discussed in this Article, which occurred surrounding the consideration and passage of a public carry law for the District of Columbia, further support the Cornell-Ruben position in two ways. First, they show no national consensus existed regarding a right to public carry under the Second Amendment. Some, especially in the Deep South, believed the Second Amendment required a broad right to open carry, others thought carry could be limited to situations where a person experienced a particular need for self-defense, and some did not believe the Second Amendment protected any individual right to carry in public at all. Because the Supreme Court in Heller stated that the Second Amendment "codified venerable, widely understood liberties," this lack of consensus casts doubt on the claims of gun-lobby scholars that a permissive public carry regime is constitutionally mandated.
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Second, the senators' and congressmen's varied positions on the Second Amendment and the permissible scope of public carry regulations generally fell into regional patterns. Representatives of states in the North and West supported a more limited public carry right, while those representing states in the Deep South, with some exceptions, supported a broader Second Amendment right. Because the Northern Republicans were the ideological force behind the drafting and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, through which the Second Amendment applies to the states, their restrictive view of public carry should be given special weight when determining the constitutionality of contemporary public carry regulations.
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In contrast, the Southern Democrats' views should not be controlling, as their legal traditions were in direct opposition to the principles driving the Fourteenth Amendment.
Section L.A of this Article surveys the history of public carry regulation in the District of Columbia from its founding to 1890. Section I.B discusses the introduction of a bill in the 51st Congress to increase the punishment for carrying a weapon in the District and the Senate debate associated with the bill. Section I.C examines the corresponding debate in the House of Representatives. Section I.D discusses consideration of the bill in the 52nd Congress, focusing on the debate in the Senate immediately preceding the bill's ultimate passage. Section I.E reviews the subsequent history of public carry regulation in the District from the 1890s to the present. Part H analyzes what the debate and passage of the District's 1892 public carry law can teach us about the contemporary debate surrounding the original meaning of the Second Amendment, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment.
I.
THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE ON PUBLICLY CARRYING FIREARMS
A. Early Public Carry Regulation in the District of Columbia
Since its creation, the District of Columbia has regulated the carrying of firearms in public. From 1791 to 1857, the District operated under the Statute of Northampton, a general prohibition on public carry, which it inherited from Maryland as common law.
2 3 In 1857, the City Council for the City of Washington passed an ordinance prohibiting public carry, essentially codifying the existing common law ban. 24 The following year, the ordinance was amended to specifically include concealed carry. 25 Meanwhile, the City of Georgetown, which had its own local government during that time period, had also enacted a public carry ban at some earlier point. 26 Also in 1857, an effort was made to codify and standardize the laws of the District as a whole, given that the District had three separate government entities at the time: the City of Washington, the City of Georgetown, and the County of Washington. In 1871, the three District governments merged. The newly unified District government passed an ordinance identical to the one enacted by the City of Washington in 1858. 29 The ordinance made it a crime for persons in the District "to carry or have concealed about their persons any deadly or dangerous weapons." 3 0 Violations of the law resulted in forfeiture of the weapons and fines ranging from $20 to $50 (about $500 to $1,200 today, adjusted for inflation). ' In 1890, after repeated public calls for a harsher penalty for carrying dangerous weapons, the District Attorney of the District of Columbia sent a request to Congress seeking legislation to increase the severity of the sanction for carrying dangerous weapons.
3 2 That request resulted in the first congressional debate on public carry regulation-one that dragged on for several years and pitted Northern Republicans in favor of regulation against Southern Democrats who opposed it.
3 3 The following sections describe that debate and its ramifications for understanding the historical scope of the Second Amendment. 3 7 The law also prohibited the transfer of firearms to those under the age of twentyone and made such transfers punishable by up to a $100 fine ($2,250 today, adjusted for inflation) and three months in jail. 38 The legislation only exempted law enforcement officers, members of the military, and militia members.
B. Introduction and Quick Passage in the Senate
The bill initially moved quickly; it was reported out of the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia in only two weeks. 40 On May 10, 1890, the full Senate debated the bill and passed an amendment to ensure the law would not be over-interpreted to prevent individuals from carrying weapons in their own homes or places of business or from carrying weapons to and from their place of purchase or a gunsmith.
4 1 Only one Senator, Joseph Dolph of Oregon, spoke in opposition to the amendment. He claimed the amendment was unnecessary because "every man and boy in the whole city can carry any one of these weapons under this section, if it is carried openly and with the intention of using it for a lawful purpose, that is, for selfdefense." interpreted the open carry provision of the bill so expansively, as the bill as amended passed without further revision or debate.
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C. Fierce Debate and Delay in the House
On May 12, 1890, passage by the Senate was reported to the House, and the bill was referred to the House Committee on the District of Columbia.4 The House moved less expeditiously than the Senate; the bill was not reported out of committee until four months later on September 19, 1890.45 On December 8, 1890, Congressman William Grout, a Republican from Vermont and Chairman of the Committee on the District of Columbia, presented the bill to the full House. 46 The ensuing debate, which was much more robust than in the Senate, showed the sharp divide between the states on the constitutionality and wisdom of regulating public carry.
Congressman James Blount, a Democrat Confederate Army veteran from Georgia, 4 7 most vehemently opposed the bill.
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Blount's opposition stemmed from his belief that the bill banned both open and concealed carry altogether, which casts doubt on the conflicting interpretation of Senator Dolph, discussed above. Blount stated:
I submit that it is certainly an infringement of the right of any citizen to undertake by law to say to him that "if you carry these weapons secretly you are liable to indictment and if you carry them openly you are liable to indictment," because it amounts to saying that he shall not carry them at all. 49 Blount's position was that a total carry ban violated the Second Amendment but that a concealed carry ban that permitted open carry would be acceptable: "It does seem to me, Mr. Speaker, that the restraint that he shall carry it openly is a sufficient safeguard to allow the citizen the privilege which the Constitution undoubtedly gives to him." 5 
Id
This view was consistent with the antebellum-era constitutional decisions of the Georgia Supreme Court-Blount's home state-which had rejected the state legislature's attempts to prohibit carry altogether and instead limited the legislature to regulating the manner of carry.s 1 In fact, Blount was almost certainly referring to this and other Georgia court decisions when he stated that "the courts have required that the weapons should be carried openly and that there was no infringement where they were carried openly."
52 Blount acknowledged that his view was inconsistent with that in other regions of the country, noting "the gentleman [presumably Congressman Grout, the bill's sponsor] tells us that such legislation has met the approval of the older and more civilized States and the larger cities throughout the country." 53 However, Blount maintained his position that "the Constitution designed that a person might carry weapons wherever he pleased; that it was a right which could not be infringed." 54 Next to speak was Congressman Benjamin Enloe, a Democrat from Tennessee, who also opposed the bill but in a much narrower manner. Like Blount, he accepted the bill's prohibition on concealed carry but rejected a complete carry ban under the Second Amendment. Interestingly, other than the reference to the Georgia court decision, Mills's criticism of the Texas law and proposed D.C. bill was based not on constitutional concerns but practical ones-namely, the standard refrain of the gun lobby that good guys with guns are needed to stop bad guys with guns.6 Mills asserted:
What is the effect of [Texas's carry] law? My own State has a similar provision [to the Second Amendment] in its constitution, and you may pick up a paper almost any day and see where the law has been violated, and sometimes life is taken by these arms which are prohibited from being borne, but which are still carried by men whose home is on a horse, who have no property, who have no home, who have nothing to fix them upon any spot on the earth. They can defy the law at pleasure; but the man who can not afford to go to jail, the man who has some reputation at stake, the man who has a family and a home and character, must obey the law and allow his life to be endangered and the security of his person to be violated because the law will not permit him to defend himself. These laws are all unwise. You can not increase the security of the people by disarming the law-abiding element of the country and permitting men who persistently defy the laws to carry arms and take the lives of their fellow-citizens. Congressman John Rogers, a Democrat from Arkansas who became a federal district court judge six years later, rejected Mills's arguments. Rogers felt that a complete carry ban was appropriate: "My own mind, my own judgment, from an experience in the Western country in turbulent times, leads me to believe that this is a proper subject of legislation, and that there should be police regulation of the carrying of concealed weapons."' Like the other members of Congress (Mills notwithstanding), Rogers's view of the Second Amendment closely followed the legal tradition of his home state, which had adopted a strictly militia-based view of the right and did not recognize a right to carry.
66 Rogers went so far as to propose new language for the bill:
I would suggest the provision which is contained in the statute of our State [Arkansas], prohibiting the carrying of these things at all as weapons. We prohibit a man from carrying any of these things as a weapon at all. We hold that he has no business to go with his little pistol stuck in his breeches pocket walking about the streets waiting to get into a difficulty, whether by his own fault or by the fault of someone else. I think that provision ought to be adopted here, because if the object of this bill is a proper one the law should be made effective.
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Congressman Grout, the bill's sponsor, supported the proposal, responding: "So far as I am personally concerned I do not object to the language suggested by the gentleman from Arkansas. I think it would be perhaps as good as that used in the bill. . This offhand comment is interesting because Vermont had no law regulating public carry. While it would be wrong to draw any real conclusions from it, Grout's comment suggests that this hands-off treatment of public carry stemmed from public carry simply not being a problem in the tightly knit rural state.
carrying a concealed weapon when carried with the "intent therewith unlawfully and maliciously to do injury to any other person" and allowed the jury to infer the intention to do injury from the fact the pistol was carried in a concealed manner. 6 9 Practically speaking, Pennsylvania's law functioned as a total ban on concealed carry.
Meanwhile, Congressman Charles Grosvenor, a Republican attorney and Union Army veteran from Ohio, took a position consistent with the Massachusetts model and his home state's treatment of concealed carry. He suggested that the bill as drafted would violate the Second Amendment if it did not include an exception for when a person faced a specific threat. Grosvenor stated:
Now, it is proposed to make it a penitentiary offense and felony to carry a pistol, no matter for what purpose. I do not believe that such a statute can be enforced under the Constitution of the United States. I do not believe that the provision in the Constitution of the United States ever intended, nor has there ever been a construction of a court put upon it, that, in order that I may be allowed to defend myself against a threatened assault, I shall be compelled to carry a cannon, a musket, or a saber; and the whole question must be put 71 in such a shape that it shall apply to unlawful carrying. 
Lanham, Samuel Willis Tucker, (1846-1908), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S.
CoNGREss 1774-PRESENT, https://perma.cc/PP7S-UPJF. the end intended as well as sufficiently guard the rights of the citizen. The courts in my State have construed the provision of the Constitution which I have read, as well as the statute from which I have quoted, and nowhere in their decisions is it denied that the State has the authority to regulate the carrying of weapons and enforce the same by suitable penalties. In order to bring about proper conditions of law and good order, it has been found necessary in that State to adopt the statute which I have read. Its constitutionally has been judicially affirmed, and to-day, as I have said, its operations are successful and satisfactory. The differing views from this single day of debate in the House showcase the widely divergent understanding of the Second Amendment in the wake of the Civil War.
76 While Southern Democrats voiced the strongest opposition to the restrictions on public carry, even they were split as to the proper scope of the Second Amendment in that context.
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Congressman Mills's testimony, in particular, suggests that the opposition was not always motivated by constitutional concerns and was instead based on practical concerns that not everyone shared (e.g., Congressman Lanham).
What is clear from the 1890 House debate is that reconciliation of the varying views was a difficult task. In fact, rather than attempt to piece together the various proposals, Congressman Grout instead recommitted the D.C. carry bill to the Committee on the District of Columbia, where it died for the session.
D. Reconsideration and Ultimate Passage in the 52nd Congress
On December 16, 1891, Senator Faulkner introduced a new D.C. carry bill in the 52nd Congress. 79 The bill was identical to the prior version but included an amendment similar to Congressman Lanham's earlier proposal allowing judges to issue licenses to carry firearms if an applicant could make a showing of necessity. 80 The amendment provided for the issuance of onemonth carry permits "upon satisfactory proof to [ajudge] insecure." 94 Mills, who was a prominent Redeemer, 9 5 then stated without apparent irony that he would "never vote in this or any other legislative assembly for the deprivation of any citizen of a single natural right that he has, if I know it, and his right to defend himself is one of the rights with which he is invested by his Maker." 96 Senator Edward Wolcott, a Republican from Colorado, Union veteran of the Civil War, and graduate of Harvard Law School, rejected Mills's interpretation of the Second Amendment. Wolcott stated:
In reference to what was said by the Senator from Texas [Mr. MILLS] I do not know except by the public press how the law permitting the carrying of weapons generally operates down in Texas, but I do know that in our cities of the North there is no law which serves so much in the interests of justice and the police power and the preservation of the public peace as acts which prohibit the carrying of concealed weapons. The constitutional provision is not affected by such a law. This bill is intended to apply to the criminal classes in the alleys of Washington who carry razors in their pockets, who carry concealed weapons, and brass knuckles. It is intended to reach them, and it is not intended to affect the constitutional right of any citizen who desires to obey the law.
For my part, I think it is a very late day for anybody to claim that under the provisions of the Constitution of the United States we have no right to enact a law which shall prohibit assassins and thugs from carrying concealed weapons. Bearing arms and carrying concealed weapons are very different things.
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Senator Wolcott's view ultimately prevailed. Senator White's motion to remove the licensing provision from the bill was rejected by a voice vote. 99 The bill then passed by a margin of 34 to 13 (41 not voting), with Republicans, Northerners, and those from states with strong public carry laws generally supporting, and Democrats from states with weak carry laws generally opposing.oo The only Republican who opposed the measure was public carry law yet again-this time, banning open carry altogether and permitting concealed carry only upon a showing of special need.
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In essence, the District went full circle and reverted to the 1892 framework. Gun lobby lawyers challenged this revised version of D.C.'s public carry law.
1 09 The revised version of the law was then struck down by the D.C. Circuit in Wrenn v. District of Columbia as violative of the Second Amendment. 1 10 The District's application for en banc review was denied, and the attorney general and mayor decided not to pursue the case to the Supreme Court. ' After Wrenn, D.C. is left with a licensing system requiring training and an in-depth background check but generally allowing any applicant without a serious 'criminal record or history of severe mental illness to get a license to carry a concealed firearm. 112
H1. WHAT THE CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE AND PASSAGE OF THE DISTRICT'S 1892 PUBLIC CARRY LAW CAN TEACH ABOUT THE ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS INCORPORATED IN THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The debate surrounding whether the Second Amendment protects a right to carry guns in public is one of the most contentious in the legal field, so it is important not to overstate the significance of the materials presented in this-Article. That being said, the history of public carry regulation in Washington, D.C. and the debate surrounding congressional passage of the 1892 law support two important conclusions. The first, and what should be a non-controversial conclusion, is that in the wake of the Civil War and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, there was not a clear national consensus about how, and even if, the Second Amendment applied to the carrying of firearms in public. Consistent with the Cornell-Ruben model, there was a geographic and political split in ideology about firearms that generally resulted in Democrats and those in the Deep South supporting a broader Second Amendment right and Republicans and those in the North and West supporting a more limited public carry right. This was not uniform, as there were notable exceptions in the South, including Tennessee, Arkansas, and Texas, which maintained fairly strict regulations, and What the debate surrounding the passage of the District's 1892 public carry law clearly shows is that in the period after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Second Amendment and its state analogues were not "widely understood" to protect a broad right to carry in public. That is not to say that complete unanimity is required to find a historical understanding of a Second Amendment right.
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There will certainly be cases where a predominant historical understanding of the right can be adopted by a court applying originalism, even when there is some evidence of disparate traditions. 12 4 Where to draw the line between a sufficient historical record to uphold a firearm regulation and a record that is too sparse is an open question in the courts and in the academic originalist debate.
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However, as the debate discussed above shows, during the period immediately following the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, there was clearly no broad understanding of the right to carry arms in public. 123. For a discussion of the various possibilities for burden of proof in the originalist analysis, see Ramsey, supra note 115, at 1970-73.
B. When Analyzing the
124. The author has argued elsewhere that the bipartisan understanding of the right to bear arms at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed states to prohibit the carrying of firearms except for those with an immediate need for self-defense. Frassetto, supra note 20 (discussing the bipartisan legal consensus in Texas for upholding fairly restrictive public carry laws in the mid-1870s). To the extent one of these traditions should prevail, it is the Northern Republican tradition of restricting public carry to those with a specific need that should ultimately carry more weight.
12 8 Northern Republicans were responsible for the drafting-and were the primary force behind the ratification-of the Fourteenth Amendment.
12 9 Northern states constituted nineteen of the twenty-seven states necessary for ratification.
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The Southern states that supported ratification were compelled to provide the necessary votes as a precondition for readmission into the Union, so it is not clear whether their traditions should carry any weight. As a result, "we should focus on the resonance of the Fourteenth Amendment text with Northern legal ideas, not those that could span both North and South. To the extent they differ from their Southern counterparts, Northern notions of equality, civil liberty, and due process are the Fourteenth Amendment's interpretive key."
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Applying this standard, the Northern view that firearms could be broadly regulated-and specifically that the carrying of firearms outside of the home could be licensed or limited to those with a specific need-should predominate. The Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to adopt the Southern view of a broad, though not unlimited, right to possess firearms and carry them in public. 
CONCLUSION
The material presented here is meant to add another piece of evidence to the academic and judicial discussion about the original public meaning of the Second Amendment. Obviously, no single source can be decisive in understanding the historical scope of a right, especially the Second Amendment, for which the historical inquiry is extremely wide-ranging. However, a historical inquiry ranging across hundreds of years and dozens ofjurisdictions is always in need of additional scholarship to clarify and add needed nuance to the field.
While it certainly does not end the Second Amendment historical debate, the history of public carry regulation in Washington, D.C. and the debate surrounding the enactment of the District's 1892 public carry law does foreclose certain arguments. First, in the period after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, there was clearly no national consensus in support of a broad right to carry firearms in public. This defeats the argument that at the time of ratification, or in the period afterwards, the right to keep and bear arms was "widely understood" to protect a broad right to carry in public. Second, consistent with the Ruben-Cornell model, it is no longer a plausible argument to claim that distinct regional traditions did not exist. The North, West, and South clearly had distinct constitutional traditions surrounding the right to keep and bear arms.
More controversially, but still intuitively, these distinct regional traditions lend further support to the view that, when applying the Second Amendment to the states, the Northern tradition should be the lens through which courts view the right as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Ruben & Cornell, supra note 12, at 127. This Northern tradition, which allowed for a broad range of firearm regulations to protect public safety, makes clear that the drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment always understood firearms regulation to be consistent with the right to bear arms.
See id at 202.
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